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This article sets out an alternative approach to the assessment and regulation of technology and
innovation, situated in and aiming at degrowth and building on an idea ﬁrst put forward in the late 1970s
by Langdon Winner called “methodological Luddism”. Methodological Luddism does not have the
original meaning of destroying machines, nor does it reﬂect a prejudiced attitude or a negative view of
technology. As outlined in this article, it sets out to overcome the presumption that technology is value-
neutral and to lower the inﬂated expectations with which it is generally associated. Technology and
forms of life are mutually interdependent, and this implies examining the constructive possibilities for
withdrawing from some technologies and adopting others, while ensuring that their role is limited to
means designed to achieve certain predeﬁned ends. The article draws on the work of Hans Jonas and
Albert Borgmann, authors yet to be acknowledged by the degrowth literature. Jonas’ principle of
responsibility is a response to the excessive prowess of modern technologies, while Borgmann suggests a
reform of technology through focal things and practices. Building on these concepts, methodological
Luddism advocates reassessing and reorienting technologies so that informed decisions may be taken as
to how they should be designed and developed as means to socially equitable and ecologically
sustainable ends. In this way the technological sphere may become an important ally in the
transformative change in society which is required to fulﬁl the axiological parameters of degrowth.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
This article sets out an alternative approach to the assessment
and regulation of technology and innovation, situated in and aim-
ing at degrowth and building on an idea ﬁrst advanced by Langdon
Winner (1978) called “methodological Luddism”. The historical
origins of the terms “Luddite” and “Luddism” lie in nineteenth-
century Britain, in the revolts of textile workers led supposedly
by Ned Ludd in defence of their way of life against the threatening
introduction of mechanization, at the same time as liberal reforms
were being implemented (Thompson, 1963; Bourdeau et al., 2006;
Sale, 2006; Van Daal, 2012). Numerous groups and movements
outside mainstream institutions and academia (Chevassus-au-
Louis, 2006) have used Luddism since the 1990s, in a context ofia), jeronimo@iseg.ulisboa.pt
arvalho).technological and economic change and global ecological crisis, to
express vigorous opposition to technology and to examine it in
critical fashion.
As a methodology,1 Winner’s proposal does not advocate
destroying machines. Instead, it questions what conventional
thought has regarded as technical and economic progress. For
Winner, Luddism is a reﬂexive methodology for reassessing human
relationships with current technology and innovation. It looks to
new technological forms appropriate to avoiding the human
problems of a technology-dominated world moving rapidly in a
wrong direction (Winner, 1978: 330).
The proposal put forward here is justiﬁed on the grounds that1 In this article, methodology is understood as not being connected with the idea
of “method”, but with the study/analysis of the evaluation of methods and the
regulation of technologies, while still being centred on scientiﬁc/ontological
questions relating to technology. Recovering the example of Luddite dissidence is
methodological because it meets the primary objective of the social sciences, which
is to offer an understanding of social phenomena.
2 This logic is also found in the well-known IPAT identity put forward in the
1970s (e.g. Commoner, 1972; Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971), which describes
environmental impact (I) as the product of population size (P), wealth per capita (A)
and damage caused by technology (T). The IPAT model sees environmental
problems as always involving multiple driving forces, and in turn that there are
multiple ways of reducing the impact of those forces. Despite this multiplicity, the
key factor is technological progress, because there has been no decline in
consumption, and population size is a controversial subject amongst emerging and
developing countries (in the degrowth literature, see Kerschner, 2010).
3 The Hydra Effect is an expression which refers to the myth of the many-headed
monster, in which each decapitated head is replaced by two new ones. With this
image, Rescher seeks to express the idea that the progress of science, technology
and human artefacts generates dynamic feedback interaction between problems
and solutions which, in the ﬁnal analysis, means that each successive solution
generates new problems (1999: 119e121). The picture of the Hydra as the many-
headed monster ties in well with Ellul’s (1964) analysis of technique. Ellul argues
that technique inevitably produces unintended consequences, so-called secondary
effects, which in turn are answered by new technique. In this way an endless cycle
of new technique is produced, justiﬁed by problems caused by previous technique
producing new problems. On the importance of the unintended side effects, within
degrowth, see, for example, Grunwald, 2018.
4 For a more detailed analysis of each of these attitudes, see Kerschner and Ehlers
(2016).
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largely involved in and conﬁgured by technological networks and
systems. The technological factor thus needs to be questioned
further, for two main reasons: on the one hand, there are inﬂated
expectations in relation to technology (Grunwald, 2018), allied with
the ubiquitous idea of its neutrality (Ihde, 1993; Verbeek, 2011); on
the other, there is a lack of understanding of how technological
progress encourages operational complexity in processes linked to
human life, causing serious problems of social diversity, political
differentiation and economic inequality (Rescher, 1999). Today’s
scientiﬁc and technological research institutions are committed to
and sustain a set of choices and technological designs largely
guided by ﬁnancial and production criteria. The emergence of risks,
and increasing inequalities and uncertainties, are some of the
serious consequences of these choices (Beck, 1992 [1986]; Krimsky,
2004; Nowotny et al., 2005). Any steps towards degrowth should
therefore bind technologies to an assessment, whether at the point
of design or in relation to their later consequences, in the light of a
diverse set of values, with the aim of regulating, encouraging,
inhibiting or reorganizing technologies in a proper fashion towards
ends.
The article is divided into four parts. Part 1 sums up some
attitudes towards technology, including the ambivalence and
scepticism which encourage discussion on the politicization
and axiology of technology. The work of authors yet to be
acknowledged by the degrowth literature, like Hans Jonas and
Albert Borgmann, taken in conjunction with Winner’s key insight,
further justiﬁes updating his concept of methodological Luddism.
Part 2, drawing on Hans Jonas, outlines how contemporary
technology demands a new rationale for action, because it has
shifted the assumptions of all previous ethical systems. Jonas
establishes the principle of responsibility as a response to the
excessive prowess of modern technologies in amplifying their
unexpected effects on nature and human life. Part 3 looks at the
consequences of realigning technological development from mere
means back into appropriate ends, using the methodological
Luddism approach to technological development and innovation to
argue for further assessment and regulation beyond current
domains and areas. Finally, in part 4, two descriptive examples of
other possible relationships with technology are presented. In both,
actors have creatively disconnected from common technological
systems. Borgmann’s concept of focal things and practices is used to
substantiate methodological Luddism throughout these examples.
2. From technological enthusiasm to methodological
Luddism
The degrowth project has incorporated several critiques of the
idea of inﬁnite progress, which emphasisesmaterial well-being and
the twentieth-century consumer society (Nørgård, 2013). Some
perspectives on degrowth have also drawn on the philosophy of
technology and social studies of science and technology, as part of a
reassessment of the assumptions and means of economic growth
and the institutions associated with it (Latouche, 2007; D’Alisa and
Kallis, 2015; Heikkurinen, 2018). These contributions have high-
lighted the limits of technological optimism, questioning the
neutrality of technology as mere means. Other authors have
emphasized the importance of not ignoring the unforeseeable, the
risks and the uncertainties which technologies bring to various
domains, warning that inﬂated expectations of technological
progress are to be avoided (Ellul, 1988; Beck, 1992 [1986]; Dupuy,
2002; Martins, 2011). In addition, declining material and non-
renewable energy sources may hinder ongoing technical
solutions for growing GDP (Bonaiuti, 2015; Kerschner, 2015;
Sorman, 2015).At the heart of these considerations lies the tension between the
technical capability achieved bymankind and the political nature of
the choices this power demands. While optimistic attitudes to
technological progress still prevail, other attitudes have emerged,
of ambivalence and scepticism, which may encourage both the
politicization of technology and an axiological evaluation of
technology. The environmental movement, for example, played a
role in questioning the direction of technology, monitoring
reactions to the Chernobyl disaster, climate change and increasing
inequality in the world (Guha, 1989; Kothari, 1990; Beck, 1995
[1991]; Grunwald, 2018).
Rather than searching for the root of problems or for multiple
solutions, the dominant tendency in the modern world has been to
see technology as the solution to all problems. Weinberg (1966)
designated this tendency as the technological ﬁx. More recently,
Morozov (2013) named it technological solutionism, and Kerschner
and Ehlers (2016) called it cornucopianism or, more generally,
technological enthusiasm. Winner (1986) coined the term
technological somnambulism to depict a culture ﬁrmly bent on
making and using sophisticated instruments, techniques and
systems to improve the human condition but only reluctantly
addressing its own foundations. All these terms question attitudes
of using one or several technologies to solve socially complex
problems as being more effective than seeking to change dominant
policies and social outlooks.2 It also ignores the fact that each
technological solution creates new problems, which Rescher (1999:
119) called the “Hydra effect”.3
Enthusiasm, however, is only one of the attitudes visible today
in relation to science and technology. According to Kerschner
and Ehlers’ study quoted above, determinism, romanticism and
scepticism are other categories to be taken into account.4 It is based
on an analysis of ecological economics lecturematerial, with strong
reference to technology and innovation, and on responses to
questionnaires applied to instructors. Currently, optimism is the
dominant note, but the tendency is towards a diversity of attitudes.
The fact that there are attitudes of ambivalence and suspicion
indicates that they might be the foundation for a new type of
creativity and innovation.
This discussion invites re-politicization of the public debate on
technological choices. As has been acknowledged, the route to a
degrowth society must seriously consider the idea of limits to and
restrictions on its activities (Schneider et al., 2010). Winner (1978:
80) already saw technology as a driving force in the social world.
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patterns of social relationships, consciousness and behavior,
adapted to technology e that other ways of thinking about the
human condition are rendered impotent or even obsolete. This
dominance is accepted as a fundamental truth, because it enshrines
the prevailing ideal of “progress” in social thought during the
industrial age. Currently, and contrary to degrowth stances (Kallis,
2011; Wells, 2018), such a position assumes the belief that market
forces will do the job if only any hurdles be kept out of the way of
general technological development (Winner, 1986: 10). The un-
derlying logic is that technological innovation should be celebrated
for itself alone, and adopted quickly and without hesitation,
regardless of any discussion on the practical implications and
beneﬁts of any given technology on collective life (Garcia, 2012,
2014). The link between technical development and the good life
is thus always taken for granted. But this insistent framing of the
human condition leads to a renunciation of the very capacity of
people and communities to choose how to live their lives and take
part in their most important decisions. New narratives for inno-
vation are needed, fed by more democratic and sustainable imag-
inaries (Strand et al., 2018).
Methodological Luddism, as will be detailed in the following
sections, is a manifold approach to establishing political scrutiny of
technology. Its adoption could narrow thewide gap betweenmeans
and ends opened up by contemporary technology. Winner
hypothesizes that when groups or individuals choose to disconnect
from certain technological systems, this creates a space where
“withdrawal” experiences emerge. This space makes it possible to
evaluate the structure of needs, habits and relationshipswith things
and other individuals in a technologically mediated existence
(Winner,1978: 332). In the context of the degrowthproject, thismay
mean decoupling technologies from the mere search for economic
wealth and a basic reassessment of the assumptions that guide or
are connectedwith economic growth and the institutions associated
with and depending on it. Overall, it aims at justiﬁably empowering
political actors towards a technological self-determination based on
the clear connection between forms of life and technological usage.6
The theory that technology is value-neutral comes into question
once it is realized that technology and values shape each other.3. Responsibility-guided technological development
Winner argued for new ways of describing and explaining
technological change that go beyond those that see it as mere
applied science or as the heir to themark of progress. Theweakness
of these assumptions is that they overlook how technologies are
not merely made by engineers and used by consumers. All the
devices present in our daily lives as “just” more technologies will
eventually merge into a linked technological system interacting
with humans, forming novel forms of social and moral life (Winner,
1986). Hence they condition the landscape of social and
environmental values and how they are pursued and maintained.
Hans Jonas’ (1979) thought stresses Winner’s focus on the need
to deﬁne the proper ends of technology. Jonas’ take on the5 The “forms of life” concept goes back to Wittgenstein’s term Lebensform in his
Philosophical Investigations. Winner reconstructs the concept by linking
Wittgenstein’s notion of the existence of patterns of life which are tied to meaning-
generating mechanisms with Marx’s idea that social activity is an ongoing process
of world-making (Winner, 1986).
6 Within the groups and movements that consciously recover the Luddite legacy,
it is worth mentioning, for example, the ecologists of Earth First, whose t-shirts
carry the logo Ned Ludd lives!; the self-titled California Croppers, who write
condemnatory letters to biotechnology companies; and in Spain the group Los
Amigos de Ludd [the Friends of Ludd] which publishes a bulletin critical of industry.technological era is demanding, in that it requires a rethinking of
the proper tasks of ethics and a new rationale for action. The power
of contemporary technology has been continuously extending over
the physical world and human life to the point that its usage has
unavoidable ethical implications. Current technological progress
has engendered a dissociation between means and ends.
Technology has largely become its own end through the search for
ever greater power and fundamentally new performative scope
over nature and humankind. According to Jonas, most ethical
systems of the past, namely utilitarianism and deontology, are
unable to accommodate the role of responsibility in the new
circumstances. Those ethical systems assumed the human good to
be immediately or locally determinable; responsibility, as a
function of power and knowledge, was hence well grounded and
limited, as the scope of action was either knowable or predictable
(Jonas, 1973).
Technological power has rendered human action so ambiguous,
permanent and cumulative that it demands a re-evaluation of
ethical judgments and a shift in human responsibility for nature,
since it is now dangerously subject to growing exploitation. The
balance between the scope of human action and predictive skills
has been undermined. Predictive knowledge of the consequences
of technology is full of uncertainty and is therefore beyond our
actions which are technologically guided. In sum, a locally conﬁned
ethics needs to be replaced by an ethics that is concerned with the
new spatial and temporal span of our actions (Jonas, 1973). The new
assumptions are ignorance as the only certainty, and the duty of
knowing coupled with an ever extant insufﬁciency of that same
knowledge.
Means need to be appropriate to ends. This gap can be narrowed
in two non-exclusive approaches: either by recovering and
upgrading responsibility and politics or by gradually altering and
assessing technology patterns until their range and ambiguity
are restricted to workable and knowledgeable limits. Jonas’
recommendations on the adoption of a precautionary attitude may
be enacted by actively forestalling the unexpected effects of some
technologies; this may well encourage local, conﬁned but ﬂexible
technological solutions (Jonas, 1979). Either approach would
restore and expand the ability to decide on and select certain
technological projects and not others, as is already the case with
several other rulings on social and environmental issues. This will
purportedly halt the pointless adoption of any means based
on its presumed utility. Winner nonetheless alludes to the
insurmountable ignorance surrounding the ways of building a kind
of technology which differs from the dominant pattern and is at the
same time appropriate to a different kind of life (Winner, 1978:
328).
Collectively and democratically identifying the ends towards
which technology should be moving can prove troubling.
Technological systems, networks and artifacts are already installed
in the “available physical and social space and employing the
available resources” (Winner, 1978: 329). Currently, the degrowth
project is fairly well furnished with an axiological discourse on
desirable ends in relation to both environmental and social values
(D’Alisa, Demaria, and Kallis, 2015). In this light, degrowth is a
political project of dispossession in the strongest sense of the term,
in which a review of current forms of life is aligned with the idea of
the common good and its relationship with nature. Once the ends
are settled, technological policies, projects and evaluations may
follow. Meanwhile, methodological Luddism encourages the search
for alternative conﬁgurations of social and technological afﬂuence,
needs and relations.
The various potential moral-technological landscapes, and how
they currently differ from our own, should be topics for both
comparative empirical studies and for research on how forms of life
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social-technological conﬁgurations demonstrate how technology
may serve real ends and be used in a responsible way, and these
features may be observed in the absence, rejection or scarcity of a
speciﬁc technology or technological systems usually taken for
granted and whose commodities are regarded as fundamental.
They may simply assign those under their inﬂuence a greater and
fairer amount of control over their design, operation and output
(Winner, 1978).4. Towards policies for the assessment and regulation of
technology
Methodological Luddism thus seeks not only to correct possible
misconceptions of current technologies, it is also a method of
inquiry. It adopts the “expressed aim of studying their
interconnections and their relationships to human need” (Winner,
1978: 330). Just like when a television set is deliberately turned off
it opens a void and other ways of creatively ﬁlling up one’s free
time, by observing how individuals and institutions strip down
from technological systems, relevant comments can be made, and
opportunities for new technologies may arise. This opening would
allow insight onwhat previous technological systems “are doing for
or to mankind. If such knowledge were available, one could then
employ it in the inventions of radically different conﬁgurations of
technics, better suited to non-manipulated, consciously, and
prudently articulated ends” (Winner, 1978: 330). Such an inquiry
then searches for instances where technological systems could be
partially disconnected or dismantled to learn and uncover how
forms of life are affected with each downgrading technological
shift.
This is a point at which technology, ethics and politics can meet
again, as Jonas (1973) would recommend. The new approach for a
technological age must then put justiﬁable responsibility-based
restraints on technological development. Jonas’ (1979) warning of
the danger and excess of our technological powers is, in this view, a
call for voluntary and political detachment, to slow down, to
simplify the pace of our dependence on technology and let ends
speak and create their own means. Humanity has always had an
urge to be creative, and technological innovation is one of its most
imposing achievements. This would not be the end of innovation as
such, but rather imbuing it with a keen sense of goals, in line with
general societal consensus on the importance of ends.
Because humanity has always valued knowledge and
innovation, the regulatory practices to be implemented must
always be discussed and weighed up in terms of ends. In the
context of methodological Luddism, the assessment of technology
thus involves reorienting technological innovation systems to
criteria well beyond those of industrial or commercial utility which
have hitherto been given priority. Existing regulatory experiences
and bodies can be expanded to other ﬁelds, intensiﬁed in terms of
assessment, and strengthened in terms of effective execution.
Expansion means including the next industrial world which the
recent technological surge is encouraging. Intensiﬁcation means
the need to include democratic, social and ecological values in
technology assessment, based on recognition of risks and
uncertainties, of the unexpected secondary and negative effects of7 This analysis reduces the value of a thing to the price of a commodity traded in
a market. This approach is very useful in judging whether a project or technology
should go ahead, because it reduces its beneﬁts and costs to a common measure.
Although some things are easily bought or sold, there are others that are priceless,
such as respect, dignity and the natural value of some ecosystems and living
beings.some innovations, and of the impossibility of absolute control
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990; Wynne, 1992; Grunwald, 2018). Cost-
beneﬁt calculations and probabilistic risk analyses7 cannot be
accepted as unique in the spread of technology; it is necessary to
establish a social contract based on the notion of social
responsibility and on axiological pluralism (Jeronimo, 2014).
Conclusions as to the appropriateness of certain technologies
should, therefore, be the result of an assessment of the project’s
various dimensions (beyond the technical component) and of
multiple visions, actors (producers and consumers), sensibilities,
interests and values. These ideas are close to a more diversity-
oriented, multi-dimensional assessment, as put forward in the
stakeholder management (Freeman, 1984) and multi-dimensional
approaches (Gomez-Sal et al., 2003; Gago and Rubalcaba, 2007),
and to the concept of “post-normal science”, in the sense that they
seek to establish a space for citizen involvement, for the democ-
ratization of knowledge, and for incorporating a diversity of ap-
proaches, research methods and axiological commitments
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990; Ravetz, 1999).
According to Winner, existing methods of technology
assessment reveal the ignored or underestimated effects of certain
phenomena, and they often assume technological change as
“cause” and whatever follows as “impact” (Winner, 1986). Those
methods argue that “effects” or “impacts” will soon emerge, to be
described and explained, and those who produce those effects and
impacts ought to welcome those changes and adjust their way of
life accordingly. But, as Winner notes, every technological novelty
mandatorily assigns new roles and relationships between humans.
Every new pattern of activity soon becomes a standard, producing a
new understanding of values, judgements and human activities.
Technology assessment should therefore recognize that most
present-day technological change creates its own world and
engineers social, environmental and political conditions and
expectations. In Winner’s opinion, to look at technological change
that goes beyond eithermaking it or using it turns the question into
a matter of politics. Even though some technologies seem to have
little or no signiﬁcance, themove towards questioning technologies
opens up a healthy space for breaking the spell of idle acceptance of
how our everyday world is materially constituted. Recognizing this
dimension encourages discussions on the implicit and explicit
effects of technological innovation on society, based on empirical
and axiological grounds that will render these choices more cogent
(Winner, 1986).
It therefore seems reasonable to demand that the material
circumstances that surround us be designed so as to promote
values such as self-government, human freedom, creativity,
sociability and care for the environment. Illich has noted the
disciplined and creative playfulness that comes from establishing
limits to unimpeded technological progress as conviviality; halting
and evaluating it is a venture bent on preventing new kinds of
serfdom (Illich, 1973). Only then will human choice escape the
pressure of necessity and straightforwardly submit technological
innovations to the wider guidance of self-determined goals, values
and social contexts. Assigning scales and limits to technology
allows a proper relation between society and its tools to be
established.
Thus, another far-sighted adoption of methodological Luddism
concerns that part of our society that requires experts to maintain,
regulate and improve the current technological system. By refusing
to continue to repair technological systems, institutions can simply
stand aside and watch how people develop new, more rewarding
and self-determined relationships with reality through technology
(Illich, 1973: 11). As Winner writes: “Many of society’s biggest
investments at present are those that merely prop up failing
technologies. (…) Perhaps a better alternative would be to let dying
8 It should be noted, however, that currently there are bicycles which incorporate
high technology materials and systems. Even with older bicycles, some models may
be quite complex.
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for something artiﬁcially ‘better’, but for totally new forms of
sociotechnical existence” (1978: 333).
5. Practices for a reform of technology
Methodological Luddism looks both forwards and backwards. It
mostly seeks to critically assess, regulate, disconnect, learn and
restart. Technological withdrawal opens up opportunities to create
new social conﬁgurations that allow technologies of a different
scale and structure to surface through new habits, needs and an
awareness of engagement and responsibility. Heikkurinen speaks
of releasement in similar terms, as a much needed and different
kind of mentality from the technological mind-set, one that can
develop as “the (often unexpected) collapses of technological
systems imply that refraining from the technological practice e
either intentionally or by accident e is indeed necessary for a non-
technologically dominated ethos and practice to emerge”
(Heikkurinen, 2018: 8).
Disconnecting from technological systems through political
means is a practical step towards achieving a more manageable
balance, one which will help advance the degrowth society. Several
thinkers (Schumacher,1973; Illich,1973; Schor, 2011), in addition to
Winner, have already pointed out a set of features of technology as
reinforcing the commons and community ties (Winner, 1978;
Rommel et al., 2018). The withdrawal from energy- and
expertise-intensive technological systems represents an
opportunity to observe, renew and identify other favored social-
technological conﬁgurations (Winner, 1978). These conﬁgurations
would open up as old dependencies on devices became obvious. In
the context of the degrowth movement, evaluating what
technologies ought to be encouraged or curbed is paramount. In a
context of limited global resources, namely oil, minerals and
drinking water, other less energy-intensive technologies like solar
panels, biofuels and wind turbines have been put forward as likely
replacements (cf. Cattaneo and Gavalda, 2010; Trainer, 2012; Kunze
and Becker, 2015).
Electricity is a good example. In industrialized countries,
connection to the conventional grid is essential for all homes, and
freedom of choice is limited to choosing from a list of providers, but
there are exceptions. Tatum (1994) investigated how the home
power movement in the US, made up of 40,000 homeowners,
succeeded in breaking down conventional access to electricity by
installing its own home power systems using renewable energy
sources. Being connected to conventional systems renders
electricity easily available, but hides from users the way it is
produced and distributed to their homes andwhat impact it has. On
the other hand, home power systems are expensive and demand
more maintenance.
The fact that home power users are off the grid of conventional
power lines limits the availability of power and means they may be
adversely affected by ﬂuctuations, errors and operating costs. This
intermittence demands commitment in the form of attention and
maintenance, shaping users’ lives and generating convivial
interactions, ranging from negotiations on how and when to use
certain appliances to tinkering with the design and optimization of
a small-scale electrical network. As Rommel et al. state “these
forms of decentralized and open technology enable people to fulﬁll
their needs through their own creativity independent from the
market” (Rommel et al., 2018). The home power movement illus-
trates ways in which changes can be made to forms of life in which
the satisfaction of basic human needs has become institution-
dependent. It was guided by a particular idea of ends, of what the
good life is in relation to others, to work and to nature.
It is precisely in this context that Borgmann’s (1984) proposalfor a reform of technology through focal things and practices is
located. They are not a way of rejecting or escaping from
technology, but rather a way of reassessing its lead role through a
commitment to other ends. As the Tatum example above shows,
dedication to home power (focal practice) can replace mere
electricity consumption from the conventional grid (a device), thus
connecting creative human interaction with material reality and
with the context in which commodities are produced. As in the
Latin word “focus”, meaning hearth, focal things gather one’s life
around other practices than ones taken up by devices. Borgmann
deﬁnes focal things and practices as those ritual human activities
that make life meaningful, “matters of ultimate concern that are
other and greater than ourselves” (Borgmann, 1984: 169).
Unlike devices, focal things and practices do not require a
division betweenmeans and ends and betweenwork and leisure, as
they produce feelings of gratiﬁcation. Hence they contrast with the
ease, availability and superﬁcial connectedness of most
contemporary devices. The orientation towards focal things and
practices which center our lives seeks to bring ﬁnal ends to
concrete practices, acknowledging how those ends currently lie
outside the more common assessments of technology.
To use Borgmann’s terms (1984), onemight think of the contrast
between the automobile and urban bicycle use, which has been
extensively documented and is at the heart of various cities’ recent
cycling policies (Pucher et al., 2010; Solnit, 2001). Both provide
transportation, but the worlds and the skills they summon are
completely different. The bicycle’s mechanical simplicity,8 the
multiple interchangeability of its parts, and the fact that it requires
physical effort to be driven mean that it can be appropriated and
repaired by anyone in a creative manner. As Bradley notes, “the
bicycle is a clear example of a convivial tool. It is fairly easy to
understand, to repair, to tinker with, and to make ﬁt the purpose
chosen by the user. It can be modiﬁed to include child seats, cargo
boxes, electric motors, different forms of brakes and gears, etc.
While most bicycles are industrially mass-produced, they can be
maintained and developed by everyday people, and users can even
build new bikes from spare parts” (Bradley, 2018). The bicycle is
hence an example of an empowering withdrawal that overturns the
bondage of how “the habitual passenger cannot grasp the folly of
trafﬁc based overwhelmingly on transport. His inherited
perceptions of space and time and of personal place have been
industrially deformed” (Illich, 1974: 37).
But this could hardly be so if the technology in question were a
device like a modern car. If it breaks down, most drivers are
powerless: the way it provides transportation remains ever hidden
in its mechanism. The car is a black box hiding the chain of labor
relations associated with its logistics, assembly and resource
extraction, as well as its environmental impact. According to
Borgmann (1984), in the history of technology there is a pattern of
mechanisms being increasingly concealed, as the commodity
becomes ever more available and ubiquitous, while demanding no
responsibility and commitment from the user.
The examples listed show how technologies which serve the
same ends may produce different environmental and social
relations, making some of them more relevant to the degrowth
project. Surveys can outlinewhat speciﬁc technological features are
more compatible with the ends appropriate to degrowth.
Implementing and importing a foreign technology, for example, is
never a value-free venture. Faced with little or no ﬁnancial capacity
to acquire parts or goods, many communities often develop or
J.L. Garcia et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 197 (2018) 1647e16531652adopt site-speciﬁc technological solutions to their problems, which
therefore tend to be more ﬂexible, repairable and empowering
because they were born and embedded in a communal context.
They tend to engender local responses through relationships with
other human activities and with the environment (De Bozzi and
Oroza, 2002; Smith, 2008).
6. Conclusion
This article offers a methodological concept with the view to
building a world in which technological change is in harmony with
the principles of responsibility and degrowth. The core of this
concept revises the proposal for methodological Luddism as a
practice or action within society which re-politicises the
interactions between technological, economic and social options,
and dissents from commercially oriented technology.
The relationship between humans and technology today should
not henceforth be seen as being axiologically neutral, just as
increased technological efﬁciency does not necessarily contribute
to improving human life or to strengthening community ties. It is
necessary to assess and outline the ethical, social and ecological
effects of technologies, thereby reassessing and reorienting them so
that informed decisions may be taken as to how they should be
designed and developed as means to socially equitable and
ecologically sustainable ends.
Behind this approach lies how technologies connect with forms
of life and hence build worlds, an issue of major signiﬁcance when
new industries are arising such as those based on rapidly escalating
commercial computerization and biotechnologies. While every
technology contributes to social and environmental change, it is
also true that the critical assessment, restructuring and contraction
of technologies may also bring about creative social transformation.
Technologies are also social constructs and interact with symbolic
creativity and the cultural variations among social groups. There is,
of course, potential technological ﬂexibility which contrasts
strongly with the current rigidity of larger-scale technological
systems. It is not a question of doing away with technological
innovation, but of stressing that there is a proper domain in which
it is possible to promote or discourage technologies, providing
concrete opportunities for scientists, engineers, designers, activists
and communities to become involved. It is particularly important
that social movements incorporate issues of technological policy as
part of their struggles and demands, in order to remove them from
expectations of short-term gain, power and wealth and place them
in a timeframemeasured by generations succeeding each other and
by ecological conservation.
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